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Abstract: On the basis of an in depth analysis of the flow of revenues within the music 
industry and of the emerging practices, we attempt to understand the logic at play in the 
current evolution of the structure of the industry. We claim that the record companies used 
to play a role that was useful for the dynamic and for the quality of music production, and 
analyze whether it can be maintained despite the impossibility for them to further control 
the formation and distribution of revenues generated by recorded music. Two antagonistic 
strategies, corresponding to different segments of the market, are highlighted in this 
paper. One targets the mass market and relies on the recognition by the on-line 
distributors of the mutual dependency between them and the record companies. It also 
admits that this music is characterized by short commercial life cycles and that it should 
be marketed as a consumer product. Moreover revenues are not necessarily generated by 
sales, but by the value of temporally exclusive release in some channels. The second 
model targets the wide number of niches at the fringe of this mass market and relies on 
the building of communities of customers sharing common tastes and values and on the 
development of their loyalty. The model is commercial, but relies clearly on the 
cooperation among the various stakeholders that build a common safe harbor enabling 
specific types of music to sustainably develop. Value added services funded by 
subscription have to be developed. 
Key words: economics of culture, cultural industries, digital business model, P2P, 
industrial organization. 
he collapse of the sales of music records and the dramatic rise of on-
line downloads of digital files - of which the vast majority is based on 
file sharing - has been generating a considerable anxiety in the music 
industry and in cultural circles since the beginning 2000's. Campaigns of 
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communication and lobbying have been organized. Bills have been passed.  
Public debates are on going. The dominant opinion within the ruling elites, in 
the press, and in the population over 40 is that everything that is possible 
should be done to restore the ability of record companies to control the 
circulation of recorded music as was the case before the development of the 
Internet and of the digital music technologies. According to most, this is the 
only way to guarantee the remuneration of artists and music producers. The 
youth, groups of activists and a few academics who have been elaborating 
the economics of free/open digital goods since the mid 1990's contest this 
vision. To put it shortly, these (mostly) economists point out the controversial 
impact of intellectual property rights on the efficiency of production and 
distribution of works of creation (whether it is works of authorship or 
innovation). They also insist on the opportunities opened by digital 
technologies by bringing cost of reproduction and distribution to almost zero, 
and by boosting the capabilities of sophisticated and wide scale systems of 
cooperation that save transactions costs while limiting fee-riding. They 
therefore call for the development of new models of production and 
distribution of digital goods (see CHANTEPIE & LEDIBERDER, 2004; 
CURIEN & MOREAU, 2006 for syntheses). 
The public debate remains quite fuzzy. The often put forward argument is 
that the collapse of CDs sales which is not compensated by the 
development of charged download, deprive the music industry of substantial 
revenues, which, by the end, will impact significantly on artists' wealth, then 
on the dynamics of creation. Since music is a cultural good, generally 
associated with very positive social values by the vast majority of the 
population (as compared to other forms of arts which have a more "elitist" 
image), this threat is considered as of major collective concern. The new 
models "highlighted" by the supporters of digital-goods-sharing remaining 
marginal, many of their arguments are considered as utopia. There is little 
proof that an alternative to the traditional pay-per-listening (of for a right to 
listen in certain conditions) could be sustainable for guaranteeing music 
creation, which implies maintaining diversity, dynamism and innovation. 
It is important to point out that the debates became central in most 
western countries not only because it is a question of a cultural good. This is 
also due to the strong role played by the government and by the legal 
framework in the organization of the industry. The invention and 
development of recorded music turned the music market into a mass market. 
Not only music became available to the vast majority of the populations, but 
also the ways it is enjoyed/consumed multiplied. It resulted in the necessity 
for those involved in the production to mutually organize to claim for rights of E. BROUSSEAU  133 
remuneration to all forms of indirect exploitation of music, and to manage 
collection and distribution of the related revenues. Moreover, the necessity 
to record music, to manufacture discs and to distribute them - which 
activities are characterized by fixed costs - led to the development of a set of 
central players controlling bottlenecks. In reaction, many stakeholders 
organized themselves into lobbies to balance the market power of these 
dominant players, and got from governments recognition of rights aimed at 
guaranteeing better bargaining positions. Also, in many countries, mutual 
societies and unions enabled the artists to collectively bargain with the 
"majors" under the shadow of the cultural authorities. Thus, the volume of 
revenues to be distributed among stakeholders and this distribution are 
strongly influenced by the government, the parliament and the judiciary. 
Groups of interests have strong incentives to push forward their viewpoint 
and to get the support of the opinion to try to influence the de factor 
"regulators" of the industry. 
This paper aims at contributing to the clarification of the debate. It draws 
mainly from an in depth case study of the French music industry 
(BROUSSEAU & FELEZIAK, 2006). The goal of this study was twofold. 
First, it was aimed at making clearer the structure of revenues of the 
different stakeholders in the industry. Indeed, if the sales of recorded music 
are falling, other "markets" - and in particular live music - are developing. 
The issue was therefore to better understand who is impacted and how, by 
the observed evolutions. This leads to point out that the only category which 
sources of revenues are really threatened are the record companies. Their 
business format has been historically based on the sales of records, while 
they were delivering a wide set of services to the artists and to the public, 
including the subsidization of new talents or artists with small audiences by 
best sellers. As long as the sales of records remained flourishing, these 
players did not manage to get revenues from these services and did not 
seek for additional sources of revenues (e.g. management of concerts). 
Their shrinking revenues leads to analyze whether these players are still 
useful; i.e. whether the services they were delivering are still needed, and if 
so who can deliver. Since record companies accumulated unique skills in 
helping artists to meet their audience, it is also relevant to question their 
strategic ability to develop new business formats on this basis. 
This paper is therefore a contribution to the analysis of the on-going 
evolution of the music industry. On the basis of observable trends, based 
both on the identification of flows of revenues and on case studies on 
various record companies and their partners/competitors' business 
strategies, it highlights that record companies are losing their ability to 134     No. 72, 4
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organize the industry to the benefit of on-line service providers and of digital 
devices manufacturers. However, part of them can become the business 
partners of these digital giants, because the latter need their skill in 
managing artists and influencing the public. Moreover, other business 
formats oriented toward servicing communities around specific types of 
music could be adopted by other record companies. 
The 1
st Section highlights the structure of revenues of the various 
participants in the music industry. It is based on the case of France. Indeed 
the specific organization of the music industry in each country makes it 
difficult to aggregate figures on a global level. Moreover, due to the 
multiplicity and  diversity of stakeholders, various types of information should 
be compiled. The 2
nd Section analyzes the way the digitalization of music is 
actually changing the logic of the industry. The 3
rd Section points out the 
narrow paths along which record companies could envisage surviving. The 
last Section briefly concludes. 
  The structure of revenues in the music industry 
According to the international association of record companies (IFPI) the 
sales of CDs has been permanently falling since 2001. The development of 
on-line sales of digital music does not compensate, neither in volume, nor in 
value, for the collapse of the CDs market. On line sales account only for 5% 
of global sales worldwide (9% in the US, 2% in France). It is essential, 
however, to point out that the sales of recorded music is far from being the 
only source of revenue. Various forms of public performance and of 
broadcasting also play a strong role. Live music accounts for almost a 
quarter of the total sales of the industry. Moreover, the revenues of live 
music are increasing at a significant rate. Between 2000 and 2005 they were 
multiplied by almost two in the US followed a similar trend in France. Such a 
trend is also observable on a wide set of niche markets ("ordered" music for 
soundtrack, for ambiance, for jingles, etc.), background music in (keep) 
public spaces, teaching and all activities linked to the music as a hobby. 
To better frame the debate on the impact of the collapse of the sales of 
CDs, we attempted to assess the flows of revenues that benefited to all E. BROUSSEAU  135 
stakeholders in the year 2005 in France. This is synthesized in table 1 1. We 
really focused on the music market. Hence the revenues derived from the 
sales of derived products, from the reselling of the public image of artists, or 
from spare time activities (e.g. teaching), are not accounted for. They 
however can play a strong role in the structure of revenues of some 
categories of artists, whether stars or semi-amateurs. We also did not take 
into consideration the wages that can be earned by many stakeholders in 
the music industry, whether they are high school teachers, employed on a 
non-artistic position in the entertainment industry, etc. Our assessment is 
based therefore on two main markets: recorded music and performing arts. 
There are three majors sources of revenues: the sales of recorded music, 
the royalties paid by music users to authors and other stakeholders involved 
in the production of music, the compensation obtained by musicians when 
they are unemployed. Indeed, France is characterized by a specific 
unemployment scheme benefitting all artists involved in the performing arts 
due to the part time employment contract inherent to this activity. This 
heavily publicly subsidized compensation regime is considered as the mean 
to maintain a population of artists ensuring the cultural creation and a high 
level of cultural activities. Most royalties paid by music users to authors, 
1 Assessments are based on numerous heterogeneous sources: the annual reports of the main 
mutual societies responsible for managing the revenues derived from the “droit d'auteur” (in 
France, remuneration rights are recognized by the law to all stakeholders involved in the 
production of recorded music. The resulting flows of revenues are collectively managed - that is 
gathered and redistributed - by mutual societies established by the various stakeholders - 
authors, singers, musicians, producers, etc. The main societies are Sacem, Adami, Spedidam, 
SPPF, SCPP), the annual reports of the commission of the Cour des Comptes in charge of 
supervising these societies, the annual reports of the main record companies (Universal, 
Warner, Sony-BMG, Emi) and distributors (e.g. FNAC, Virgin), the annual reports and the 
figures provided by the various bodies in charge of the unemployment compensations for 
musicians (Caisse des Congés Spectacle, UNEDIC, ANPE; see also Guillot, 2005; ), various 
reports occasionally or regularly produced by specialized institutes (Ministry of Culture (DEP), 
GEMAP, SNEP; Nicolas 2005, 2006; Amar and Koubi, 2004) and various interviews in the 
industry to get a better understanding of the sharing principles applied to sales and derived 
revenues (Abeille Musique, Harmonia Mundi, Virgin, Atmosphérique, Skyrock, Frémeaux et 
Ass., Ideal Audience, Music Web). 
The crossing and comparison of these data enabled to produce the following assessments. 
They were triple checked. First, most single assesmment result from estimation derived from 
different sources. Second the overall consistency of the flows of revenues within the industry 
was analyzed. Third these data were compared to other studies attempting to proceed to 
comparable assessment (e.g. Curien and Moreau, 2006). Despite these checks, assessments 
remain open to discussion. The music industry remains characterized by the wide number and 
the diversity of the sources of revenues. Moreover, most of the revenues that are not 
collectively managed by mutual societies are hard to track and practices are quite 
heterogeneous. Lastly, the resulting aggregate should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, 
whether they are confirmed stars or half-benevolent, artist have quite contrasted levels and 
structures of remuneration. The same is true for record companies, for instance. Small 
specialized labels and majors operate very different business models.  136     No. 72, 4
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musicians and producers are "collectively" managed in France. That is, the 
law establishes the level of royalties to be paid in various contexts by the 
users of music - whether they are radio stations, restaurants, discos, 
filmmakers, etc. - and mutual societies collect these revenues and 
redistribute them to those benefitting from right of remuneration. In addition 
to the "droit d'auteur" that recognizes copyright to authors and composers, 
the French law of 1982 recognizes specific rights to producers and 
performers. Lastly, those who sell music, either recorded or live, pay 
contractual fees to the various contributors to records or shows.  
Table 1 - The Structure and Distribution of Revenues  
in the Music Industry in France in 2005 
Recorded Music 
Contractual Management  Millions of Euros 
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+20.3 6.8 12.7 471.2
+213.7 46 290  ** 
Retailers and On-line 
intermediaries 287.8 30.3 1.8 36.54 356.4 -
(XX) Contribution of the various sources of mandatory royalties to the collective remuneration of 
authors
* Unemployment compensation    ** Revenues of show and concert organizers 
Altogether, the sales of (recorded and live) music account for 
1,647.50 M€ in 2005. The collectively managed royalties are estimated at 
635 M€ in 2004. And the compensation for unemployment account for 
82  M€. A significant share of the sales of recorded music goes to the 
marketing channels, while most of the sales of live music are shared 
between those really involved in the production of music. Indeed, concerts 
play a strong role in the ability of performing artists to get revenues, and live 
music is a breeding ground and a training field for young artists. 
Record companies usually integrate part of the distribution channel. They 
are both recorded music producers and wholesalers. As it will be explained 
later, in the past, this business format enabled them to control value 
extraction in the value chain and therefore to get enough revenue to E. BROUSSEAU  137 
subsidize the low selling artists thanks to hits. It is also essential to keep in 
mind that the recorded music producers are different from the show 
producers. 
Sales of recorded music generate 751.4 M€ of revenue to be shared 
between those involved in the production of music (authors, performers, 
producers). The same categories benefit from 460 M€ of net contribution2 to 
their activities of (collectively managed) revenue drawing from the various 
professional and indirect uses of recorded music. Live music yields 540 M€ 
of sales plus 82 M€ of unemployment compensation. To put it another way, 
sales of recorded music account for about 41% of the revenues of the three 
categories of players participating to the production of music. While this 
source of revenues is decreasing, the two other sources are progressing. 
Indirect revenues collected by the French mutual companies grew by 9% 
between 2002 and 2004 and the live music market grew by 35% in the same 
period 3 (see also, KRUEGER, 2005; CURIEN & MOREAU, 2006; 
BOURREAU & GENSOLEN, 2006). As pointed out by several academics 
commenting the "crisis" of the music industry, the fall of the sales of CDs, 
while an issue for the music industry, is not necessarily a vital one for 
musical creation and live music. 
 It is essential to point out, however, that the various sources of revenues 
do not account for the same share of the total revenues of the various 
stakeholders; hence strong differences in perception of the collapse of the 
CD market. Revenues from authors and composers are almost fully 
managed thanks to collective management. Sales of CDs contribute only up 
to 17% of these revenues. Performers get most of their revenues from live 
music. According to our assessment, it accounts for almost 75% of their 
revenue (with a quarter provided through unemployment compensation). 
Thus recorded music accounts for only 25% of their revenue, 43% of which 
being related to mutually managed royalties. Thus, all in all, sales of CDs are 
only minor contributors to the revenues of singers and musicians; 
approximately at a 15% level. Lastly, production as a whole gets its revenue 
up to 46.1% from the sales of CDs, and up to 20.9% from the wholesale 
2 Indeed, collectively managed royalties account for 567 M€, but sales of music generate 
collectively managed fees for the authors that should not be double counted here. 
3 The total sales of live music are very difficult to assess in France due to the high diversity of 
the organizations involved in music shows. Beside concert halls and tour organizers, there is a 
wide number of public institutions and non-for profit organizations. Sales are estimated on the 
basis of the revenues collected by the mutual company in charge of the interests of authors and 
composers (SACEM). 138     No. 72, 4
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sales of the same CDs. Indirect revenue from mandatory royalties 
represents 4.5% of these revenues. Live music generates 28.4 % of the 
revenue of producers. However, record companies and show producers 
have totally different business formats and are not integrated. Thus the sales 
of recorded music (mostly CDs) represent in reality around 94 % of the 
revenues of record companies; sometimes a bit less when they have a 
department or a subsidiary responsible for the production of music shows. 
On the contrary, the revenues of the producers of shows and concerts are 
fully and exclusively generated by sales and grants linked to their core 
business.  
These figures clearly illustrate the actual issue raised by the fall of the 
sales of CDs. Music producers' survival is questioned, while the other 
category of players seems to be able to easily compensate the losses due to 
the dropping music sales. Especially because the bases of their revenues - 
mandatory royalties for the uses of recorded music and musical show 
business - are growing. It is also worth noting that in the present days, where 
most of the sales of recorded music are still based on CDs, retailers and the 
state (through VAT) capture more than 60% of the gross revenue generated 
by music. These various figures point out therefore that there are margins for 
reorganizing the flows of revenues between the various players in the value 
chain, if needed. 
  Toward a new organization of the music industry 
The shrinking ability of record companies to gather revenues 
and to organize the industry 
Record companies have been playing a central role in the music industry 
since the 1960's. Together with the consumer electronic manufacturers they 
boosted the development of a mass market for recorded music (LABARTHE-
PIOL, 2005; CURIEN & MOREAU, 2006). On its side, the consumer 
electronic industry has been permanently inventing new technologies that 
decrease the costs, enhance the quality and diversify the capability to play 
music. This has been generating new habits; in particular the permanence 
and the ubiquity of access to music. On their side, record companies have 
been playing an active role in the enrichment and segmentation of the 
supply of recorded music. In response to a strong demand for contents, E. BROUSSEAU  139 
record companies have been developing specific methods to "develop" and 
"market" new artists. Music being a strong vector of social distinction record 
companies had to respond to the increasing number of niches that came 
with the individualization and fragmentation of the society in multiple 
communities (based on generation, social milieu, ethnic origin, etc.). They 
became experts in identifying new trends, spotting potential artists, training 
them to respond to demand, providing them with the infrastructure and 
means to issue work meeting demand, advising them to manage their 
career, etc. 
Record companies were able to play this role because of the fixed cost 
structure of the industry. The production of masters - the initial record - and 
the establishment of fame require important investments. These investments 
became even higher with the technological development - i.e. the progress 
toward hi-fi that, together with the development of the skill of the audience, 
has been requesting a permanent enhancement of the quality of the 
masters, orchestration, execution, etc. - and with the massification of the 
music market; the audience to reach becoming larger and the competition 
due to the winners take all nature of the competition becoming harsher. This 
increasing fixed cost economy enabled record companies to become central 
in the value chain (GRONOW, 1983; ALEXANDER, 1994; LABARTHE-
PIOL, 2005). 
However, the distribution of physical support remains quite a costly 
activity. Record companies played an active role in bringing these (marginal) 
costs down by encouraging the concentration of demand on a reduced 
number of artists/records and by accelerating turnover (VARIAN, SHAPIRO 
& FARRELL, 2006). They did so by strengthening the promotion of artists - 
especially by developing cooperative links with the mass media systems and 
by investing in communication and advertising means - and by taking control 
of the distribution; hence the investments of majors in wholesaling 
(BOURREAU & GENSOLLEN, 2006; CURIEN & MOREAU, 2006). That is 
why major companies are providing today an integrated package of services 
to artists. Beside the production of masters, they ensure the development of 
their career, the management of their communication, the pressing and the 
distribution of their records. 
The strategy followed by the record companies contributed to reinforce 
the star system, which is in any case inherent to cultural industries 
(BENHAMOU, 2002). In the same time, because demand is hard to control 
and to forecast, the record companies played an ambiguous role in the 
matter of supply of diversity. Indeed they relied on the huge benefits 140     No. 72, 4
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obtained from stars and hits to subsidize a wide set of low selling artists. On 
the one hand, pure marketing logic is at play. All the specialists of the 
industry know that it is very hard to forecast the success of an artist. There 
are also ups and downs during a career. Record companies had to maintain 
breeding ground to ensure a minimal level of commercial success. The 
necessity to subsidize low selling artists is also a strategic necessity in a 
competitive environment where new fashions can rise quicky. On the other 
hand, many managers in artistic industries have, beside their marketing and 
financial orientation, a patronage logic. Either for prestige or because they 
have beliefs and preferences, they consider it essential to support low selling 
but talented artists. In any case, this necessity to organize cross-
subsidization among artists was also one driver of the integration of several 
activities in record companies. 
This logic of the organization of the industry changed drastically with 
digitization and the rise of on-line distribution. The resulting changes have 
however to be qualified (CHANTEPIE & LEDIBERDER, 2005; BROUSSEAU 
& FELEZIAK, 2006). Indeed, it is often argued that digital networks are 
pushing most costs down. First, the costs of production of masters are not 
significantly decreasing. While demonstration records can be produced 
cheaply, professional quality masters still required high tech studios and, 
above all, highly specialized production teams. Second, promotion costs 
remain high because on-line exposition is not sufficient. Search costs are 
high on the Internet due to the numbers and wide range in quality of the 
displayed material. All the available studies point out that promotion costs 
represent 20 to 25% of the price of a CD. That is a higher share than the 
costs of production (BOURREAU & GENSOLLEN, 2006). Indeed, 
advertising, access to media, communication campaigns remain necessary 
to promote artists. Third, while reproduction and transmission costs of a 
digital sequence tend to zero, the cost of secured distribution are far from 
being negligible. If one refers to the price charged by on-line retailers, 
distribution cost for a 0.99 € file are roughly 0.15 € 4.
So, while the economics of music is evolving, it is not dramatically 
changing. Record producers, as intermediaries between the supply and the 
demand are still necessary. Indeed, they have been developing actual and 
strong artistic and marketing capabilities enabling artists to develop their 
talent and to meet their public. In addition, as entrepreneurs, they hold 
4 Costs of distribution by a traditional retailer are 0.35 €, which represent 29.8% of the price 
before tax. Thus on line distribution is indeed cheaper, but not free. E. BROUSSEAU  141 
"industrial" and commercial risks and provide cash in advance. The main 
problem is obviously that with the development of digital networks and 
associated practices of file sharing, they are no longer able to secure their 
revenues (BOORSTIN, 2004; BOURREAU & GENSOLLEN, 2006; MARTIN, 
2004, 2006). They are consequently losing their capacity to play their 
traditional role of cross subsidization platform between stars and low selling 
artists, which threatens their business models since it is core in their ability 
to identify and develop artists… and moreover to maintain a breeding 
ground. 
At first sight, record companies have three solutions to recover revenues. 
First, they could call for recognition of their role by calling for an extension of 
their "neighborhood" rights. Indeed, recorded music adds a lot of value to 
many activities. In particular, the attractiveness of digital networks is partly 
due to the availability of free music. It would be therefore justified to extend 
the logic of mandatory royalties and to increase the share of the producer of 
music. However, as highlighted in table 1, the potential losses of revenues of 
music producers are roughly 680 M€, while the total net revenues of the 
collective management is 460 M€. It is clear that such "solution" is far from 
being implementable. Moreover, the logic of the entrepreneurial role of the 
music producers, which will no longer benefit from a link between the 
success of the artists and their revenues would disappear. It would have a 
strong impact upon their incentives to efficiently identify, train and promote 
performers. Second, record companies could integrate activities, like the 
show business, which are developing. With shrinking revenues, record 
companies have however little capability to grow internally or externally. 
Moreover, many segments of the live music market are poorly profitable and 
are operated by non-for-profit organizations. Concerts will hardly 
compensate for losses of CDs revenues. Majors are nevertheless attempting 
to consolidate their ability to get revenues from all indirect uses of music. 
They do so by reinforcing their position as editors of music. They are 
currently actively buying back catalogs of works that they intend to valorize 
as editors. These catalogs are then exploited under '360°' model consisting 
in multiplying the sources of revenues (merchandising, live mobile, clips, 
etc.). In the same time the current revenues drawn from the musical edition 
are a tenth of the revenue drawn from the recorded music, and majors are 
already controlling 65% of the global market. Edition will also hardly 
compensate for the losses of revenue linked to the reduced sales of CDs. 
The last solution is to develop a new business model recognizing the 
platform role of the record companies between the artists seeking to develop 
fame and access to audiences, and the various users of music calling for 142     No. 72, 4
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contents. "Virtual labels" are developed by record companies to change their 
relationship with the artists. Instead of signing "artist contracts" with them, by 
which commercial risks and costs of development and of promotion are 
borne by the producers, service providing contracts are proposed. Artists 
remain the owner of the master record, and pay for the various services 
provided by the "virtual label". Given the limited wealth of most artists and 
the star economy, this model is obviously hardly sustainable. Only confirmed 
stars have the ability to accept these kinds of contracts, while in the same 
time they remain the only potential sources of subsidization of low selling 
artists for music producers. 
New business models have therefore to explore new sources of potential 
revenues if producers of recorded music want to continue to play their role of 
"go between" for artists and their audience. 
On-line distribution platforms: friend or foe? 
Incumbents did not transform the organization of the music industry in 
place for the last 50-60 years. In particular, authors and performers did not 
change their "business format" with the rise of digital technologies. While it is 
technically possible to self-produce a record and to distribute it on-line, there 
are only a dozen significant examples of this being done by recognized 
artists bypassing the record companies and the established marketing 
channels. As pointed out above, a high-quality master and a secured 
distribution system are costly. Moreover, exposition in the media is difficult to 
manage. The famous example of the Arctic Monkeys is in fact misleading. 
Indeed this band became famous thanks to the free distribution of its albums 
and benefitted from a strong "buzz" on the Internet and in the media. It then 
signed a very standard contract with the label Domino and embraced the 
traditional business format. Also there are only a few examples of free/open-
source music communities. The pure distribution channels constituted by the 
file sharing systems, do not organize a remuneration of artist and music 
producers. They are therefore more tolerated than supported by those 
involved in the production of music. When production is taken into 
consideration, the sustainability of free music is in question. They are few 
on-line free/open-source music communities. Most of them distribute the 
produced music for free and target amateurs (BROUSSEAU & FELEZIAK, 
2006). A few, such as Jamendo or Dogmazic.net, attempt to call for 
responsibility of the audience by requesting voluntary contributions (as in the 
shareware model). At this point, there are not as it is the case in the software E. BROUSSEAU  143 
industry (cf. LERNER & TIROLE, 2002), associated markets for services of 
active sponsors that would (directly or indirectly) remunerate contributors 
and allow sustaining of a significant production. At best, contributors can 
hope to reach fame and to "be signed" by a major, but the low audience of 
the existing communities do not encourage this strategy as compared to 
those targeting traditional circuits: concerts and mass media. While 
"ideologically" significant, these models remain "emergent" and did not 
destabilize at all the core music business. 
What really destabilized the industry is the entry of new players that have 
been promoting digital and on-line music. It has to be reminded, however, 
that these entries are not a historical exception (LABARTHE-PIOL, 2005). 
The providers of recording/execution technologies have always been playing 
a strong role in the music industry. They entered in the "production of 
content" business each time it was needed, in particular to develop new 
markets. Sony and Philips, for instance, are good examples. But there are 
dozens of others. Today, on-line distributors and manufacturers of consumer 
electronic products (including computers) are the major new entrants in the 
industry. They have two major characteristics. First, their size is much larger 
than that of the players in the music industry: in 2003, the global sales of the 
telecommunication industry and of the computer industry reached, 
respectively, 1,555 and 1,747 billion USD, while the recording industry total 
sales were 38 billion USD. Second, they are highly diversified, and the music 
market is one of the numerous content markets they can reach and they 
have to deal with. 
They thus have a tremendous financial capacity and a real ability to 
cross-subsidize activities. In particular they can use music as a loss leader, 
their goal being to make profits on the selling of traffic or electronic device. 
They face ,however, two constraints. First, their core business and their 
main know-how remain network administration or computer design and 
manufacturing. They have little incentive to invest a lot in the risky and low 
profitable business of music production (and in all the segments of the 
entertainment industry). Since in the same time, the dynamic of the 
production of contents is essential to sustain the sales of their services and 
products, they have strong incentives to support record companies. Second, 
they are often submitted to significant anti-trust pressures. It can have two 
contradictory effects. On the one hand, it can reduce their profitability on 
their core market, and therefore push them to reinforce predatory practices 
on fringe markets like music. On the other hand, oversight by antitrust 
authorities can lead them to reduce their propensity to capture rents from 
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Strategies of new entrants are differing in function of their nature. The 
main players are the consumer electronic manufacturers (which include 
computer manufacturers), the mobile operators and the Internet Service 
Providers (ISP), as well as some dominant digital service providers. 
Consumer electronic companies seek to develop the digital music market on 
the basis of their technical standards - including in particular their own Digital 
Right Management (DRM) technology - both to sell their technical platforms 
(both players and servers) and to license their technology to third part (on-
line retailers, other consumer electronic manufacturers, etc.). Two players 
dominate the market - Apple and Sony - and they are clearly involved in a 
standards race (with, for instance, alliance between Hewlett Packard and 
Apple, and between Dell, Musicmatch and Sony). Mobile operators are 
considering music as one of the types of content that can boost their supply 
of broadband services. It enables them, in particular, to target the young 
audience and to encourage the adoption of multimedia terminals that would 
further support the development of additional services. Music is clearly a 
loss leader product. In the same time, mobile operators need to cooperate 
with the actors of the music industry to develop new and innovative services 
justifying on-line access to music as compared to portable music. Also, they 
have to differentiate among each other and to develop exclusivity services. 
The streaming of concerts or the early release of albums are two of the 
strategies that have been explored. Music is however one of the multiple 
dimensions of the packages they need to develop which include news, video 
on demand, games, advanced services, etc.). ISPs, Portals and Search 
Engines are also important players. All have interest in assembling services 
either for a fee or on a free basis (BROUSSEAU & PÉNARD, 2007, 2009). 
ISPs, as mobile operators, can rely on exclusive services to differentiate. 
Portals and search engines, like Yahoo! or Google develop package of 
services aimed at maximizing audience and extracting data relevant for 
marketing. In that context, while most of these players did not make 
significant moves up to this point, they could enter the music distribution 
market and play an important role. 
The strength of the new entrants is both a threat and a source of hope for 
the incumbent firm in the music industry. On the one hand they can extract 
most of the rent that benefitted the music record companies until the rise of 
on-line distribution. On the other hand the new entrants realize that they are 
about to dry up the source of a flow of contents that yield part of their 
revenues and profits. The "winner takes all" nature of the competition on 
digital networks can place the future dominant distribution platforms in the 
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80/20 law according to which 20% of the production generates 80% of the 
sales - and that 90% of the profits comes from 10% of the production; 
Benhamou, 2002 - will remain the iron law of cultural industries, then 
dominant players will have to continue in the future to organize cross-
subsidization among artists. Digital distributors can play this role (CURIEN & 
MOREAU, 2007). They can also leave it to the existing recorded music 
producers since they have the know how. It would mean the development of 
new commercial practices between music producers and on-line distributors 
enabling the former to yield enough revenue to continue to "develop" artists 
and maintain a breeding ground. 
The harsh competition to become the dominant distribution platform in 
the short term is both an opportunity and a threat for the development of 
these new formats. On the one hand incentives to buy or gain access to 
large catalogs at low price are strong, since it is a necessary condition to 
become a single counter in the middle of the market. On the other hand, 
digital platforms have interest in benefitting from exclusive access to certain 
artists and catalogs. It opens perspectives of more balanced and more 
cooperative relationships with record companies and music editors. 
  Toward two models for music production? 
The rise of on-line digital distribution has been impacting deeply the 
ability of record companies to collect revenues. They are therefore 
experimenting new practices. Some of them have already been discussed 
above and seem unable to restore the capability to cross-subsidize and 
develop artists. Most of these unsustainable solutions seek for a restoration, 
while the "basic conditions" of the activity have changed. Other strategies 
are precisely based new opportunities opened by these changes. Moreover, 
it is worth noting that the collapse of the "record" based model is not only 
due to the digitization and "on-linazation" of music. Also the statute of music 
in society has evolved, with consequences for the propensity to pay for it. 
The new framework has to be understood. 
Consumers attitude, propensity to pay, and diversification of behaviors 
The low cost of diffusion and duplication of music, well before the digital 
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generalized access led to transform the perception of music by the 
audience. In many situations, music is not chosen. It is imposed as a 
component of the environment, often in the frame of marketing strategies. 
The combination of permanent access, with the known low cost of 
reproduction, with the huge profits made by some stars (and for a long 
period by recording companies), with the understood non-rival character of 
consumption, and with the assumption that most tunes generate indirect 
revenues, has been leading to a decrease in the the propensity to pay for 
(recorded) music. More precisely, consumers are discriminating among 
contexts. As pointed out by CONNOLLY & KRUEGER (2005) they have a 
higher propensity to pay for live music than in the past. In the matter of 
recorded music, they often establish a strong distinction between a request 
to access freely to a wide catalog to test and an agreement to pay for their 
favorite pieces and artists, especially if they can benefit from value added 
packages. Several studies also pointed out the reluctancy of several 
categories of consumers to pay for downloaded files on their computer, while 
they accept high prices for phone rings. There is clearly room for distributing 
music under different formats in function of the context; which is after all, a 
received practice in other segments of cultural industries. In particular, the 
motion picture industry pushed quite strongly the differentiation and the 
timing in the commercial exploitation of movies. 
Two attitudes of consumers deserve to be mentioned here. First the 
propensity of consumers to accept advertising (or other forms of pollution) in 
exchange of free contents, and their potential preferences for bundled sales. 
Funding music thanks to a valorization of audience has long been the 
model of the radio system. It started for music on demand with the Peer-to-
Peer networks that were funded thanks to advertising. Up to this point, the 
capability to capture the attention of specific audiences and to valorize this 
ability to fund the production of music has been loosely exploited. It is 
however evolving. Vivendi Universal and EMI reached an agreement with 
two platforms - SpiralFrog and Deezer - that propose free streaming and free 
downloading in exchange of viewing commercial ads. Marketing surveys 
show that a share of users, especially younger ones, are ready to accept 
ads in exchange for reduced rate of free provision of on-line services. On the 
opposite other categories are ready to pay "premium" rates to get enhanced 
and advertising free services. 
Digital technologies facilitate the implementation of price discrimination 
as discussed by SHAPIRO & VARIAN (1999). The combination of tracking 
and digital rights management technologies makes it possible at reasonable E. BROUSSEAU  147 
costs. These practices are however not well received by the users, who do 
not easily accept paying different prices for using the same piece of music 
on different platforms. Moreover DRM technologies are far from being fully 
reliable and unjustified default of compatibilities occur (PETRICK, 2004). 
Lack of legitimacy stimulates hacking of the protected pieces. The bundling 
of the distribution of digital music with other services, which exclusion is 
simpler to organize, is a good way to bypass this lack of legitimacy of price 
discrimination. As pointed out in standard microeconomic textbooks, 
bundling results also in price discrimination (SHAPIRO & VARIAN, 1999), 
and also prevents reselling/sharing among consumers. This is why one 
witnesses the development of packages of goods and services, which 
certain components like network access or technological devices are easy to 
secure. 
These elements combine, first, to remind the central role that can be 
played by the on-line distributors. With the generalization of the distribution 
of dematerialized music, they will become the only parties able to manage 
access and gather revenues. Second, they show the narrowness of the path, 
since users will never accept either a return to a uniform price of access to 
recorded music - we just saw that their propensity to pay for music vary in 
context -,or what they judge as unacceptable practice; namely practicing 
standard price discrimination for the same file of digital music. The only 
discrimination they seem to accept is when digital files are not accessible in 
the same conditions and on the same platforms. 
Depending on the type of music, two main strategies/business models 
seem to be available to music producers. The first one targets the core of a 
global mass market of popular music. The second one corresponds to 
specific types of music dedicated to specific communities at the fringe of the 
mass market. 
Managing chronology on the mass market 
The first model seeks to exploit the "transient nature of fame". It 
corresponds in a sense to a deepening of the model that has been 
dominating the recording industry for the last thirty years. It aims at capturing 
as soon as possible the most value from a "product" of which its commercial 
life will be short. Two reasons explain this. First, popular music is to a large 
extent based on a succession of fashions punctuating individual and 
collective lives. Hits are remembered for a long time, but bought only once. 148     No. 72, 4
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Second, in the digital era, free copies are rapidly circulating on a wide scale, 
especially for more popular songs.  
The strategy relies on two pillars. First, the massive selling of new 
release as quickly as possible. It is close to the model that is applied today 
to the most "marketed" products, like real TV outcomes, summer hits, and 
other marketing concepts (boy bands, models, etc.). It is only a 
systematization of this model and an extension to all artists. The model 
combines huge promotion campaigns with minimal DRMs to slow down the 
diffusion of copies. As compared to the present model, there is no way to 
manage sales in the long run. Once the launching period is over, no further 
sales are expected and catalogs generate only indirect revenues. 
Short period of selling is combined with another strategy aimed at 
extracting as much consumer surplus as possible. The chronology of release 
can be cooperatively managed with on-line distributors (as was done with 
the early release on the Orange network of the single "Hang-up" by Madona 
in 2005). Contract of exclusivity can be settled. Some service providers can 
market bonuses and enriched versions. 
It is easy to understand that this model is only available for a style of 
music that is targeting a wide audience. Moreover, because of the 
uncertainty of the success, on-line distributors have to understand the 
inevitability of failures and the minority of success and to adapt contractual 
practices and remuneration schemes accordingly. This call for long term 
cooperation between digital music distributors and recording companies, 
rather than quid pro quo spot exchange. 
Exploiting niches relying on communities 
Beside the above-described market of short-lived products with high 
turnover, the music market is characterized by the existence of multiple 
niches in which long-term relationships are established between the artists 
and the audience or around a type of music (jazz, classic, regional, ethic, 
etc.). The audience is much smaller, but stable. The Internet and digital 
technologies are a unique opportunity to reshape the performance of these 
niches and the music producer can play a role. 
First, since these markets are characterized by small numbers, the 
dramatic reduction of fixed costs in the matter of distribution combined with 
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makes it possible to distribute extended catalogs to fully exploit the "long tail" 
effect. A bunch of additional services can be provided: rich meta-data to 
easily retrieve specific interpretations, performances by specific musicians, 
etc.; specialized data-basis, newsletters, forums, etc. Related services, and 
in particular the organization of concerts, can be delivered in synergies. 
Several small specialized labels and music editors - like Abeille Music in 
France - have already developed such packages of specialized services that 
are clearly aimed at providing an audience with a portfolio of services among 
which production and commercial synergies exist.  
Second, the web is already used by some artists to develop links with 
their audience. Confirmed stars as well as new comers rely on web site to 
display information and provide samples of their work. The trend is however 
clearly to develop interactivity. Beside these pure top-down information sites 
developed by artists, blogs, chat and community sites are relied upon to 
discuss work, signal new talents and accelerate word of mouth effects. This 
trend is in line with the success of on-line communities in which amateurs 
and semi-professionals share information and knowledge, and manage 
cooperations (GENSOLLEN, 2004, 2007; DANG N'GUYEN & PÉNARD, 
2007). We already mentioned the most advanced practices in the matter of 
free music communities. The dominant practice remains however, the 
sharing of experience and discussions that maintain communities unified by 
common tastes. Small specialized editors could provide on-line services to 
develop and stabilize communities, and to favor interaction between the 
artists and their audience. This would clearly enrich their supply of service 
and develop customer loyalty.  
Thus the second available model for recorded music producers is clearly 
based on logic of partnership with the artists and the audience. Beyond the 
traditional role of artist development, the idea is to help the demand to 
structure itself to constitute a strong niche with clear, recognized and stable 
cooperative relationships between the three parties. The cooperative logic of 
this model prevents free riding and the cannibalization of sales by circulation 
of free copies. The modest size of the community and the development of 
interactive relationship making tangible the relationships of mutual 
dependence, individuals should be more likely ready to contribute. 
Moreover, the provision of packages of services should favor the principle of 
subscription to unlimited access. 150     No. 72, 4
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  Concluding comments 
On the basis of an in depth analysis of the flow of revenues within the 
music industry and of the emerging practices, we attempt to understand the 
logic at play in the current evolution of the structure of the industry. By 
contrast with several academic analyses that no longer see a future for 
record companies, we claim that the record companies used to play a role 
that was useful from the perspective of the dynamic and the quality of music 
production. This utility was twofold. First, it favored the meeting between the 
artists and their audience thanks to the development of artistic and 
marketing capabilities. Second, it ensured the development of artists and the 
maintaining of a breeding field thanks to a capability to cross subsidize 
artists; the latter drawing from the mastering of the flow of revenues. On-line 
distribution deprives these actors of this latter capacity and therefore of their 
ability to provide the "artistic" services provided in the past. The only solution 
for them to survive, and for the other stakeholders in the industry to continue 
to benefit from the provision of their services is to seal a new alliance. Two 
antagonistic directions, corresponding to different segments of the market, 
are highlighted. One targets the mass market and relies on the recognition 
by the on-line distributors of the mutual dependency between them and the 
record companies. It also admits that this music is characterized by short 
commercial life cycles and that it should be marketed as a consumer 
product. Moreover revenues are not necessarily generated by sales, but by 
the value of temporally exclusive release in some channels. The second 
model targets the wide number of niches at the margin of this mass market 
and relies on the building of a community sharing common tastes and values 
and on the development of its loyalty. The model is also commercial, but 
relies clearly on the cooperation among the various stakeholders that build a 
common safe harbor enabling specific types of music to sustainably develop. 
Value added services funded by subscription have to be developed. 
These two models are clearly contrasted. However, as pointed out by 
BROUSSEAU AND PÉNARD (2007, 2009) the development of new 
business models in the digital industries, often relies on combination and 
hybridization between quite contrasted practices - free and paying 
distribution, community based and pure transactional interactions, etc. - and 
the actual models that will develop will probably try to combine the logic of 
the dynamic management of release in the short run with that of the value 
added and interactive services in the long run.  E. BROUSSEAU  151 
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